

# The Over-riding Driver Dynamics in Ethio-South Africa Migration

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## Abstract:

Ethiopian youths and adults have been migrating from South Ethiopia to the Republic of South Africa since the 1990s. Related studies on sub-Saharan Africa and particularly on Ethiopia have mostly emphasized the combined relationships of the two end drivers, the contemporary patterns, but have yet to examine the domestic and international political dynamics, migratory experiences that contributed to shape the present migration features over time and places. These drivers have been incorporated within the purview of natural, political, and econometric domains, further obscuring overriding factorial dynamics and their changing aspects, which this study elucidated. This investigation addressed the migration experiences of the Hadiyya and Kambaata ethnic groups and explored how their migration practices shifted from domestic and micro level to international and macro geospatial levels. It also considered discrete periods, intervening variables, and other changes that have shaped and reshaped these communities' migration patterns and trends. This study applied a concurrent longitudinal study design via a multisided ethnographic approach. Qualitative semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with purposively selected sixty-eight (68) respondents, conducted twelve (12) focus group discussions along with ten (10) in-depth interviews. The study was conducted from June 2016 to June 2019 in two selected rural villages of Hadiyya and Kambaata zones in Southern Ethiopia. It also encompassed the downtown locations of Johannesburg and Pretoria, where most Ethiopian migrants reside. In so doing, the study sought to answer three key research questions: how and why the practice of emigration has emerged and transcended beyond the political boundaries of Ethiopia to South Africa and how the migration drivers are evolving. The paper's discussion section elucidates that migration is not a new phenomenon for these communities; instead, it forms a historical continuum as a culture and a survival strategy to combat resource constraints. However, migration has been galvanized by the combined

poverty, political oppression, displacement, and structural, sociopolitical, and economic marginalization after the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front came into power and instituted ethnicity-based regionalism. Migration is sustained by overriding factors, accompanying changes and challenges at local, national, and international levels. These difficulties cannot be measured merely through environmental, sociopolitical, or econometric-based conditions prevailing at specific times and places. Their determination requires factors beyond such time-bound incidences and parameters. This article designed, discussed, and illuminated such comprehensive

## Introduction

In the struggle for human adaptability, the features of migration are shaped and reshaped by its cause-effect dynamics over time and space. People have been migrating for centuries from one corner of the world to another in response to socio-economic, cultural, political, and ecological factors. However, the contemporary boom in international migration and its vexing problems have been calling for further investigation; new policy approaches that will help maximize the potential benefits of migration while minimizing its risks (Adepoju, 2006; Jonsson, 2009; Parnwell, 1993). Nowadays, displacement, irregular migration and transboundary human mobility have become some of the top global debates and discourses regarding poverty, climate change, conflicts, political instability, development and security, which requires further examination through congenial epistemological and ontological perspectives. In the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia is a potential source, host and transit to many migrants and refugees from the region to the Middle East, Europe and South Africa. Though no studies depicted how many Ethiopians have made their journey to South Africa through irregular means so far, Horwood (2009, P.27) estimated that since the 1990s, more than 20,000 irregular male youth migrants have been migrating annually to the Republic of South Africa. While some of them reach the destination country, others are repatriated, killed, detained or end up in the middle of nowhere (Estifanose, 2016). Studies also depict as Ethio-South African migration was liner since commencement (Horwood, 2009 and Estifanos, 2017) but failed to show how the domestic and international dynamics of the then period lead for the formation of the migration, the contributing factors and the social networks that this study attempt to assess.

Many studies depict that migration drivers as most often caused by a linear combination of two ends, 'push-pull' circumstances, which failed to portray the driver dynamics, the role of diverse actors and the process that gears the dynamics, which has shaped and reshaped the migration over time and place. Migrants have varying degrees of agency and structure in the process (Spener, 2009; Treiber, 2013), which is ever-present in-migrant labour markets around the world and variously interpreted (Goh et al., 2017; McCollum & Findlay, 2017). Thus, it is argued that understanding contemporary migration is not complete without understanding the 'whole process, including the historical background and the cause-effect dynamics at both ends, which is the focus of this article.

For this study, two theoretical frameworks are used. These are push-pull migration theory and commutative causation. The geographer Erns Ravenstein (1876, 1885, and 1889) introduced the two-end law of push-pull migration driver to study migration. Drivers are socioeconomic and political factors motivating people to move away from their residence and head into a new location. His work was argued to be more of a pragmatic generalization but unable to show the nature of international Migration (Kivisto & Faist, 2010). Lee (1966), explained the theory later in a better way, considering the two ends of migration drivers along with intervening variables. Nevertheless, the model has proven inadequate and needs to be more accurate in elucidating real-world migration processes. It failed to explain migration as social dynamics, put drivers in place without specifying their characters or offering a structural account of the social processes that propel populations to move (De Haas, 2021) and "lacks a framework to bring them together in an explanatory system," Skeldon (1990, P.125–126). On the other hand, cumulative causation was developed to explain the persistence of international migration flows once the migration had started between two places (Massey et al., 1993; De Haas, 2010). This theory postulates that migration is primarily a social process driven through social networks in the communities of origin. These networks mitigate barriers to migration and ensure the reproduction of migration over time from the sending area. The theory contends that people attaining migratory experience become a source of "migratory social capital" for other people from the same community of origin (Ibid). The accumulation of migratory capital in the sending area makes migration accessible to anyone living in that region (Massey et al., 1994). The theory also oversimplifies social conditions, arguing that the feature of prior migration from a given area does not always create feedback or generate further migration. It might be restrained by certain conditions in the origin or destination communities, and it is essential to consider the notion of weak solidarity norms at the origin (Fussell & Massey, 2004; Hernandez, 2008) and the lack of opportunities for migrants at the destination (Heer, 2002; Kubal & Dekker, 2014).

Based on the empirical and theoretical points of view, the study argues that Ethiopian Migration to South Africa is the continuum of the 1970s and 80s famine, drought, forced resettlement, refugee flow, and the complex challenges these refugees encountered both at the domestic and international level like in the refugee camps of the neighbouring countries mainly in Sudan and Somalia. The migration was commenced without significant prior information and pulling factors at the other ends. This was changed in the 1990s with the political transition in Ethiopia and the advance in migration facilitation network between the two countries, Ethiopia and South Africa. Thus, the two end migration drivers, as well as intervening variables, are not always interdependent and independent by themselves. these tendency, then transformed migration over time and places, and mobility appears not always a matter of people's capability to do it or not but a complex socio-cultural and economic factor that determine as a whole

## Method of the study

This study was conducted in the villages of Hadiyya and Kambaata Zones in Southern Ethiopia and the downtowns of Johannesburg and Pretoria in South Africa. Informants were purposively selected from three generations of migrants who had had refugee experiences in transit countries (mainly Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti and Somali) and headed into South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, and those who drifted directly from Ethiopia in the post-1990s. Migrant households and

non-emigrant families were also included accordingly. Qualitative data collection methods were applied due to the sensitive and complex nature of the study. For the investigation, semi-structured, unstructured in-depth interviews, case histories, and document analyses were used. Semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with purposively selected 108 informants (36 out-migrants, 24 returnees, and 48 non-migrants) in three phases: the first was from June 2016 to January 2017, the second from March 1, 2017, to May 10, 2018, and the third from July 2018 to June 2019. Informants were selected through snowball strategies based on their migration experience and knowledge about Ethiopians migration in South Africa. Data were also collected through participant observations in which one of the authors stayed with migrants in South Africa and with families of migrants, non-migrants, and returnees back home. Additional data were gathered using eight key informant interviews and twelve focused group discussions. Finally, and most importantly, the researchers reviewed updates on related issues and followed up on the updates with the respondents through regular phone interviews.

## Results and discussion

The Hadiyya and Kambaata Zones in Southern Ethiopia are among the most densely populated parts of the country located in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Regional State (SNNPRS), with a population density of 342.6 and 502 per square kilometers respectively (CSA 2007). Besides land scarcity, agricultural productivity is very low because of land fragmentation, high relief variation, excessive soil erosion, over-exploitation, deforestation and recurrent drought. As a result, the region has been prone to famine and flooding. The communities inhabiting this region have developed the practice of seasonal and circular migration to different parts of Ethiopia, this happened during the off-farm season. In 1980s Ethiopia experienced a disastrous famine of colossal number of deaths (sources). This triggered a state led resettlement of people from famine-stricken areas including Haddiya and Kambaata zones. Many household take part in the program and had resettled in Gambella and Metekel, in the present-day of Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State. The first batches of migrants from South Ethiopia to South Africa are those who resettled in those resettlement sites in the 1970s and 80s and later on flew to the refugee camps of Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia.

Some discrete assumptions about the commencement of Migration from Southern Ethiopia to South Africa do not critically engage with such longstanding socio-economic and political developments. They assumed that it started in the 1990s following changes of regimes both in Ethiopia and South Africa. The argument has been the changes of regimes resulted in policies that favoured free movement of people and causing the commencement of the migration (Teshome et al., 2013; Zack & Estifanose, 2016). These studies failed to recognize the presence of thousands of Ethiopian migrants in South Africa before the 1990s political change in the countries (Horwood, 2009. P.19). It also appears that the above authors captured not the high refugee flow to the neighbouring countries before the regime change while overstating the role of the regime changes in facilitating the emigration of Ethiopians to other countries. They downplayed the socio-political dynamics before and after the regime change in Ethiopia and the neighbouring countries. Ethiopia was among the most refugee-producing country during the 1980s under the military government and a 'hotbed' of political instability and ethnic conflicts after the coming of EPRDF into power. Thus,

refugee flow from Ethiopia dates to the 1970s and 1980s when famine and drought caused people to flee to the neighbouring countries of Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti. As informants portrayed, Ethiopian refugees, mainly in Sudan had established their living; some working for private business owners, missionaries, and humanitarian agencies, whereas others established small and micro businesses. However, their survival was challenging due to the high temperature, recurrent drought, diseases and political instability, which pushed to migrate further to nearby and far countries whereas other heads into South Africa. One of our informants explained his experience as follows:

*"Many people were dying due to malaria, and diarrhea. Most refugees, including me, were unable to cope with the high temperature since most of us were from the highland part of Ethiopia. It was terrible and thus in one or other ways everyone was attempting to leave the country." (Date of Interview: May 15, 2016).*

Moreover, the migration both from Ethiopia and the neighbouring countries persevered due to the intensification of droughts and ethnic conflicts in the country and the recurring large-scale conflicts between militant groups in Sudan and Somalia. Anti-refugee rhetoric by the local communities and political parties also made the lives of the refugees to be strenuous. Militants and locals often targeted the social services centers and facilities provided to refugees by international organizations, and these organizations were challenged and gradually decline their services to the refugees. Such problems exacerbated the complex problems of the lives of the refugees. Then these refugee hosting countries appear to be a transit to refugees than site of settlements. Some of them faced post-conflict trauma, mental health, and homicides. The combination of these problems pressed refugees to seek other migration options from the camps and find new places to survive. Later, the perpetuation of such complex situations transcended the migration pattern beyond two to three borders that extends up to the Republic of South Africa. A former refugee in Sudan who has lived in South Africa for 35 years said:

*'In the eyes of the hosting communities, refugees were blamed for the high economic inflation, expansion of crimes, alcoholism, prostitution, HIV/ AIDS, challenges of sanitation and hygiene, the spread sexually transmittable diseases.'* (Date of Interview: August 23, 2017).

Experienced migrants argue that the refugees in some camps of the neighbouring countries, mainly in Djibouti and Kenya, had confronted quite dissimilar challenges whereas migrants to Sudan and Somalia were extremely vulnerable. In these countries, militants often raided some refugee camps and looting and abducting children, youth, and women for military service. Persecutions and mass attacks were common incidences. According to the migrants, however, refugees in Kenya and Djibouti used to face fewer and more minor difficulties than in Sudan and Somalia due to the stable politics in the country. In their opinion, the post-1990s migration patterns and the routes to South Africa shifted predominantly through Kenya for this reason. However, the migration routes through Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti have resurrected recently after Ethiopia established an anti-human trafficking act in 2013 and tightened its border control over areas with significant emigration and smuggling facilities.

During those hard times for the refugees in Sudan, almost all aid organizations were on the verge of a shutdown due to recurring attacks on the service amenities,

death, and the detention of aid workers. Some Aid personnel were targeted because of allegations of attracting refugees in more significant numbers. Similarly, the local communities blamed refugees for the spread of HIV/AIDS, prostitution, and alcoholism. Thus, these kinds of incidents put them in a dilemma of peace and war and find options for the refugees. The UNHCR, UN Refugee Agency, and missionary organizations availed three opportunities to refugees. These are voluntary repatriation to Ethiopia, "relocation"<sup>1</sup> to a third country, and an attempt to sustain refugee programs in camps with limited intervention and facilities. Thus, some migrants were repatriated to Ethiopia in collaboration with the military government. Others, primarily those who identified as educated and owned educational credentials, took advantage of a relocation. Thus, many Ethiopian refugees were repositioned to the USA, Canada, and Sweden, primarily from the refugee camps of Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti. However, some non-literate refugees affiliated with missionary activities in refugee camps benefited from relocation to South Africa. Most of them were ethnic Hadiyya and Kambaata. One such refugee of that time described his experience as follows:

*"...the relocation was organized in four phases. When we were relocated to South Africa, we were about eight hundred in total, and nearly three hundred of them were ethnically Hadiyya and Kambaata who had escaped from Pawa resettlement in Ethiopia and sneaked into Sudan refugee camps. Most of us had close relationships with the clustered missionary churches. In the churches and the refugee camps, we served refugees as client service workers, counsellors, gospel men, chanters, and humanitarian service providers. At that time, I was a pastor, and now I have my own churches in Johannesburg and Pretoria." (Date of Interview: May 8, 2018).*

Conversely, those refugees who could not get the opportunity of relocation in any category used their migration strategy, which they called 'random walk' to indicate the mindset of "let us move in a group, no place which could be the worse than the refugee camps." This act involved moving anywhere out of the country and reached to Rwanda, Uganda, Malawi and as far as Zimbabwe. Informants indicated that a moving group was organized among the refugees for mutual assistance during the journey that was hoping to support each other until they find a better place, mostly 'safety.' The first step of such movements was blind, so migrants were aiming to escape from the complex challenges. It also needed to have had prior information about the place of destination, but not since it focused not to discover a better place but to escape the challenge back in the refugee camps. As a result, the consequences they faced were also diverse; some encountered death, wildlife attacks, whereas other found safe place and welcoming community. This trend continued until 1994, when the migration chains gradually became patterned and established from the refugee camps and neighbouring countries to the places refugees identified as relatively safe. Strongholds evolved along this chain, extending through the Southern African countries, and reaching the Republic of South Africa. It may thus be contended that migration may be determined without necessary correlations between two end factorials, such as the push-pull migration encryption described by the early migration theories that are now deemed classical. In the abovementioned instance, difficulties at one end (generally the source) can

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<sup>1</sup> Relocation was a program organized by The UNHCR and refugee agencies used to move refugees to third countries where there are families and organizations willing to host them with their expense of adaptation.

determine the migration decision without a set destination; inversely, the migration driver may not be able to determine the destination.

In discussions, informants portrayed that the practice of random walking peaked between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s just to escape forced refugee repatriation to Ethiopia and the detention of ex-politicians of the erstwhile military government after the People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) wrested power in the country. Refugees who had discovered new sites through random walks pulled their friends from the refugee camps to the neighboring countries mainly from Sudan like to Uganda, Tanzania and as far as Zimbabwe, while those without friends walked mindlessly. For instance, informants indicated the features of their random walks stating as "አያንዳንዱ አድል አንደመራው" (everyone guided by their respective fortunes); "ሁሉም አግሩ አንደመራው" (all, as their legs guided them). They also indicated the nature of their sources of migration-related information as "በስማ በለው" (hearsay) and "በጭምጭምታ" (through rumor). These phrases elucidate the arbitrariness of the endeavors of the migrants and the process extremely capricious, blind, and uncertain nature of their travels as Turner's (1969) indicated in his notion of "liminality" that at the kick off social dynamics there are always ailments and strewn features. It was impossible for them to predict the consequences of their movements, and improbabilities to find safe places were most likely but the problem driving them behind.

Migrants indicated that the composition of refugees of such early migrations was somewhat diverse. Most of them were male youth and adults. In contrast, females and children were comparatively insignificant. These migrants were the first to establish Ethiopian enclaves and routes from South Africa across the southeastern corridor countries to Ethiopia. Today, it is possible to find many Ethiopian communities who had established since those days across these corridor countries of eastern and Southeastern Africa. Indeed, the modes of travel, migration directions, and travel conditions were complex, risky, and uncertain. Nevertheless, the practice contributed substantially to establishing migration networks and facilitation industries across the corridor. After such migrations began, the children and families of the refugees joined them primarily in South Africa after apartheid rule was terminated in 1994 and the ruling African National Congress instituted a family reintegration program. In turn, a window of opportunity was opened for more families, friends and relatives both from Ethiopia and the neighbourhood countries to continue to join refugees in South Africa through social networking, family visits, marriages, and tourist visas.

In the 1990s, Ethiopia's political transition had also triggered diverse social dynamics comprising hopes, risks, uncertainties, and high tendencies of migration. The ruling party who come to power at the time, EPRDF, instantly established ethnic-based federalism along language lines /or ethnic identities in the new form of the federal structure. Subsequently, minority ethnic groups were ignored and denied due attention in each regions. Ethnicity-based cleavages and social labelling emerged in competing claims of "us vs them." The venture toward federalism arguably added significant momentum to the development of hatred along ethnic lines, tending toward the total height and maturity of ethnic conflict. In each region, the dominant ethnic groups positioned themselves as legitimate to reside, own resources and control political powers, whereas the settlers or nonlocal residents were forceful resettled since the great famines of the 1970s and 1980s through government programs were denied fundamental human rights: the right to own property, free-movement and take part in political decisions. Resultant conflicts became vented in almost all parts of the country immediately after the

EPRDF took charge. Hundreds of thousands of families who had intermarried and lived together for many years were disrupted, displaced and evicted.

Historically, according to Klose (2008), Hadiyya and Kambaata farmers had experienced settlement in the upper and lower Awash Valley of Ethiopia with the development of agricultural plantations in the 1950s, long before the great famine. However, after half a century, ethnic-politic denoted these settlers as vulnerable of conflicts and mass displacement. The social labelling of "we" and "they" resulted from ethnicity, which engendered mistrust and violence between the settlers and the locals and subsequently induced conflicts and bulk dislodgments (Gebre, 2002; Asnake, 2003). These displacement sites include Metekel (Benshangul Gumuz region), Tappi (SNNP region), Itange and Akobo (present Gambella region), Sheka and Dawro (present eastern region), the Wondogenet, Wondotika, and Siraro districts (present Oromiya and Sidama region), and Wonji and Metehara (Oromiya region).

According to the migrants, 1990s were called "the years of double displacement and high refugee flow" because most displaced individuals were those who were forced from their home village to resettle into different sites by the military government in the 1970s and 1980s famine and unable to reconnect back to their village. The worst facet of the displacement was the absence of humanitarian aid, alternative settlements, and political measures to mitigate their difficulties, mainly the flow of the displaced to the land of Hadiyya and Kambaata Awraja,<sup>2</sup> was overwhelming and needed to be more manageable. The then administrator of the Emergency and Disaster Office of the Kambaata and Hadiyya Awraje or Province explained the situation of the time as follows:

*"In a single year from September to July 1992, we hosted nearly 100,000 youth, children, and adults displaced from different parts of Ethiopia, mainly from Metekel, Arsi and Gambella. Then, after the number grew very fast, we had no resources to help them; some reintegrated with their relatives while capable adults and youth migrated to different countries, including South Africa." (Date of Interview: May 15, 2016).*

According to government officials, from 1991 until 2005, the number of displaced returnees to Hadiyya and Kambaata was extremely high, which created complex socio-economic problems. Archival sources estimated that within those fourteen years, approximately 300,000 displaced children, men, women and seniors arrived from different parts of the country into the two zones looking for rehabilitation support (Kambaata and Hadiyya Awraja Aid cooperation and rehabilitation office, 2007). Key informants Sources also indicated that the actual figure would be higher because of the extraordinary displacement flow rates and the lack of organized documentation by the country's administration. Some displaced people did not report to their local administrators; others moved to different parts of the country where they found places to stay. Gebre (2003, P.15) also disclosed the magnitude of the displacement rates of that period, indicating that around 34,000 people were displaced in a single day after a resident of Gumuz was killed by mistake in a wedding ceremony. Most victims were Hadiyya, Kambaata, and Wolayita settlers. Migrant families indicated that some displaced individuals returned to their places of origin, while others went to Hawassa and other parts of the country. Those who went home were not welcomed by families

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<sup>2</sup> "Hadiya and Kambaata Awraja" was the provincial name where the two ethnic groups were administered since the feudal regime to the coming of EPRDF.



in the villages due to resource constraints, and their last fate was to undertake mass migrations beyond Ethiopia's political boundaries, mainly to South Africa, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Europe through the Mediterranean Sea.

Besides agriculture, the community of Hadiyya and Kambaata used to practice seasonal and circular migration to subsidize their living (Pankhurst, 1996). Due to high population, landlessness and low productivity, the communities used to cover their subsistence through migration mainly in off-farm season. These seasonal and circular forms of migration were the most common and mandatory practice among able members of the families to travel to different parts of the country where they could pick up temporary jobs. The most common migration destinations were those discrete regions, where they could pick jobs including farming, construction, shoe shining, street vending, mining, and working on sugar plantations. These sites were Halaba, Arsi Negele, Shashamene, Shakeso, Hawassa, Wondo, Wonji, Metehara, Tendaho sugarcane, and cotton plantations, Upper Awash Agro (Shack, 1966; Pankhurst, 1996). However, ethnic politics and conflicts desiccated the practice of seasonal and circular migration. According to key informants, in most regions no jobs can be picked up by non-ethnic members of the regions, and minorities who either reside there or seasonally migrate looking for jobs. They faced socio-political and structural marginalization, which marked as ethnic territoriality was instituted. Informants indicated that these days such movements would be too risky. Nowadays, all jobs are occupied by local inhabitants based on specific criteria of eligibility such as proof of the number of years the person stayed in the village, possession of residential identity cards, the ability to speak local languages, and social ascriptions for all the stated conditions. Thus, ethnic politics have become entrenched within the sociopolitical, cultural and economic structure of the community to privilege some and deny the other. This in general constrained opportunity of mobility, dissolved social integration trends and endangered communities' traditional socio-economic coexistence. Therefore, the Hadiyya and Kambaata peoples had no villages, towns, and townships to migrate to and subsidize their living, so they were forced to look outside Ethiopia for migration opportunities, opting predominantly for South Africa. Tens of thousands of young people leave their home country to head into the Republic of South Africa to meet their ambitions and dream of a "better life." One of the smuggler in the border town of Moyale, between Kenya and Ethiopia, said that:

*"I have been in the business for the last twelve years. On average, I facilitate smuggling for about 40-70 migrants per day, and you can imagine how many people cross the border per month and year." (Date of interview: October 11, 2017).*

On the one hand, displacement and the end of seasonal and circular migration drove people to migrate beyond the national border; on the other hand, transnational migration facilitators have emerged. The first of those facilitators, locally called "Berkefet." 'Berkefet is to mean that the one who stepped up local migration into an organized form of international migration.' Berkefet," or "door opener" according to local communities, means the one who opens opportunity and brings luck to the community in facilitating Migration (Fekadu et al., 2019.p.3). These facilitators have strong connections with emigration officers, government officials and border guards. They also have agents to recruit migrants from the grassroots, accompany them to the border, host them in transit loci, and smuggle and transport them across borders and countries up to the Republic of South

Africa. These facilitators have their own structure, logistics and hosting facilities and engage in informal financial transactions locally called 'Hawalla.' These facilitators have a chain of facilitation that extends from each small village to big cities in the neighbouring countries as far as South Africa, Europe, and Saudi Arabia. In Hadiyya and Kambaata, those facilitators are also named after their role relations. They call 'feraancha' or 'recruiter,' 'gegesaancha' for 'the one who would accompany migrants to the border and 'higisaanacha' for the one who would smuggle migrants across the border. These names are based on the role relation among the actors in the whole process of migration facilitation. The facilitators are from the same migrant communities, so there is a tendency of trusteeship, accountability, and responsibility to organize the migration safely and fast, though there have been incidences exhibited among migrants like death, detention, deportation, and imprisonment during the journey. Anyways, in one and the other ways, the emergence of the migration facilitation chain remained one of the factors for the migration driver. One of the recent migrants living in Johannesburg indicated his understanding of the facilitation industry as follows:

*"Facilitators are everywhere; they provide information, narrate success stories, negotiate facilitation, charges for cheap, and sometimes assist in the facilitation of debt. So most youths are highly agitated by them and meet their migration ambition." (Date of interview: January 22, 2016).*

Periodic elections in Ethiopia, which the ruling party monopolized, have also pushed adult men with different political opinions to migrate beyond the country; otherwise, they would spend their entire lives in prison. This consequence was exhibited during the first national election held in the country when the EPRDF took control in 1995. The second and third national elections occurred in 2000 and 2005, causing mass emigrations from rural as well as urban parts of the country since most youths and farmers did not like the then government and elected opposition party, which triggered the ruling party to target them. The ruling party was defeated by the opposite parties in Hadiyya and Kambaata, and the parties were called 'HNDO' (Hadiyya et al. Organization) and "KONDA" (Kambaata et al. Organization), respectively. Thus, the leaders and most of the supporters of these parties were targeted by military intelligence. According to the party leaders of the time, many were killed, imprisoned, and tortured, and those who escaped the security surveillance flew to Kenya and subsequently migrated to the Republic of South Africa. The party members continued to face systematic oppression, and Pausewang (2002, P.18) asserted that:

*"Both the Kebele and Woreda authorities penalize HNDO and KONDA candidates and supporters even listing out their files, role profiles, and signatures from the party office."*

Further, scholars have also cited some significant events as factors attracting families, friends, and neighbours from Ethiopia to South Africa (Teshome et al., 2013; Zack & Estifanose, 2017). The nomination of the Ethiopian ambassador to South Africa in 2002, who is purported to belong to the migrant ethnic community and the World Cup that South Africa hosted in 2010 were some examples of such events to attract migrants. Migrants hoped for the protection of the ambassador, obtained migration information, and met the high demand for labour during preparations for the World Cup. Visits of family friends after the nomination of

the ambassador in 2002 served as sources of migration information and amplified migration aspirations in the community. Job opportunities soared in South Africa during the 2010 World Cup, and the high foreign labour demand opened an opportunity for them.

Similarly, Ethiopian businesspersons also required much migrant labour to operate discrete new businesses to satisfy the high service demands of that period leading to the World Cup, which they thought would be very profitable. Labour vacuums triggered migration facilitators to participate in a labour export and import industry with a formal license to assist soccer fans. Many migrants also sponsored their families and relatives to join them. Some of the so-called migration facilitators were later found to function as migration scammers. They allegedly received bribes from 200 people, almost 45 million birrs; one such company was named after "Askalukan Trading" (Ethiopian Forum, 2010)

Unemployment and the high Poverty levels among the youths in the community have intermittently worsened despite the deterrents mentioned above, driving youngsters to migrate. The populations of the Hadiyya and Kambaata zones are increasing (CSA, 2012), and the sizes and fertility of their land holdings are dwindling because of divisions and overproduction. According to the report of CSA (2012), the HZFO<sup>3</sup> (2016, 2017 & 2018), and KTZFO<sup>4</sup> (2018), these two zones are among the most highly populated areas of the SNNPR with about 350 and 550 P/km<sup>2</sup>, respectively. Their respective average family sizes are also seven and nine, which is exceptionally high compared to the other zones in regions of the country. According to informants, these zones also display dismal employment opportunities for university graduates or high school dropouts.

Similarly, the economic disparity between migrants and non-migrant families is increasing and causing many members of non-migrant families to migrate. Of course, income disparity is not the sole reason for migrations in non-migrant families; migrant families are also perceived to have high social value. Migrant families are believed to have access to better sources of income, material guarantees, high social capital, and superior values. Thus, non-migrant families prefer to engage in social relationships with migrant families. Likewise, migrant families also prefer to establish relationships with other migrant families. In congruence with King's (2012) assertion, such correlations allow the contention that "the notion of access to mobility as a differentiating factor of socio-economic and class inequality, which in turn shapes the relevance of existential and emotional dimensions of the non-migrant families and cost what they aspire to attain in their future through migration."

Finally, but most importantly, in the later periods, social expectations towards the youths to shoulder responsibility in supporting families and the aspirations of the youths to meet their migration ambition are some of the drivers of Migration in Hadiya and Kambaata communities. Capable youths and adults are culturally responsible for subsidizing the economy, including to the nucleus families and extended relatives. Thus, they would mainly be pressured to migrate and make their interests real. Informants depicted that these kinds of social pressure exposed most youths to risk-taking migration, which they operated without interest and called 'impelled migration.' Unless those who avoid fulfilling their responsibilities receive socio-cultural punishments such as exemptions from social assistance, marginalization, and avoidance, capable family members strive to find ways to migrate and fulfil social expectations. Migration is a collective action to which all

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<sup>3</sup> HZFO Hadiyya Zone Finance Office

<sup>4</sup> KZFO Kambaata zone Finance Office

families, relatives, and community members contribute. However, the levels of responsibility, social expectations, and social pressures vary according to the relationships between community members. One of the migrants explained his experience as follows:

*"Look, I am the oldest son in the family. I have three young sisters and two brothers. My father is 82, and my mother is 73, so they cannot plough land to assist families. So, all the burden lay on my shoulders. Indeed, I had no interest in migrating to South Africa since I lost three of my friends, one in Tanzania and the other in South Africa, so I took a security job at night and used to plough land at that time. However, my parents, aunts and uncles were unhappy with my job and pushed me to migrate. Sometimes, they teased me, mainly because my dad felt terrible that I was not listening to his advice on migration. But one day, I decided to migrate since I was frustrated by my job and the high pressure of my family and relatives to migrate. Then, I migrated to South Africa without my interest. Fortunately, I arrived in South Africa in 2017 but still struggled to make money and satisfy my family." (Date of interview: September 12, 2018).*

On the other hand, due to the high remittance effect on the disparity between migrant and non-migrant families, most youths have high migration ambition to realize their dreams of achieving what they call a 'better life.' In contrast, others maintain their economic status in society." Informants note that these dreams to migrate further would not stop even when they arrived in South Africa. It has been observed that youths from well-established migrant families keep migrating to more than two or three countries to reach Canada and the USA. Therefore, as Manstead (2018) has contended on social behaviours, the material conditions in which people grow up and live impact their personal and social identities, influencing how they think, feel, or act. Thus, as long as human demands are jumping from one level to the other, the preference to move also changes and causes the continuum of migration, and this can sometimes show as there would be simultaneous relationships between migration drivers, human behaviours and migration ends.

## Final remarks

Ethio-South African migration began following the transferred Ethiopian refugees with the help of missionary agencies working with UNHCR through the programs called "relocation." The relocation was organized from the refugee camps of the neighbouring countries', mainly from Sudan to South Africa, in the 1970s and 80s. However, since then on, the migration trend was not well organized and patterned until the late 1990s. Those relocated refugees had played a significant role in pulling their friends and families following the family reunion policies of South Africa on one side and the advent of self-initiated migration facilitators. Then the migrants were named as driver-driven rather than pulled by the gravity of the migration ends and the practice of the migration called 'blind and through random walk.' Even refugees had little information about relocation ends, and that little information's they had were merely about imperialism and the apartheid rule of South Africa, which they had learnt from the socialist government of Ethiopia. Thus, most refugees leave refugee camps planned how to escape the harsh living conditions and unexpected incidences in the refugee camps. The flow of refugees

and migration-related information gradually intensified along with the trend of self-initiated migrants who attained the hands of cross-country truck drivers, humanitarian workers, and mining labourers from eastern and southeastern African countries. Indeed, the social network gradually shaped through the change and challenges of the socio economic and political dynamics at the domestic and international level in Ethiopia, and in the neighbouring countries as far as the Republic of South Africa. Then today's migration characterized as the continuum of the migration experiences of the Hadiyya and Kambaata communities from Southern Ethiopia.

In the 1990s political change in Ethiopia, the new ethnic-based government arrangement fueled the existing tension between settlers and indigenous and instigated ethnic conflicts in almost all corners of the country and the extradition of tens of thousands of dislodges; among these, Haddiya and Kambaata farmers were among the majority. The arrangement also restrained seasonal and circular migration, among the two ethnic communities who had relayed to subsidies their subsistence. These two phenomena prompted them to look for migration options beyond the country's border, which transformed the local migration into the international level, mainly to the Republic of South Africa. This international migration advanced with the emergence of a facilitation network and the involvement of different actors. The consecutive local and national elections of Ethiopia from 2001-2005, the political nomination of the Ethiopian ambassador to South Africa who ethnically belongs to the Kambatta community, and the 2010 World Cup happened in South Africa served as a high migration pull to cause tens of thousands of youths to migrate both through the formal and informal ways. The election, mainly in 2005, caused the migration of hundreds of thousands of opposite political party members and their leaders following the defeat of the ruling party. On the other hand, the nomination of Kambaata origin ambassador and his families enhanced the flow of migration information to the community and migrants developed a sense of security hoping to get protection from the ambassador. The 2010 World Cup created new job opportunities, and attracting many migrants from abroad including migrants from Ethiopia. Migrants were also interested in creating new businesses and pulling their family members into the country to work for them. Remittance-induced economic disparity, the struggle for social status and the migration ambition among the potential migrants and their families also exacerbated the high migration flow. The life of non-migrant families has been deteriorating, compared with migrant families since they have no remittance to earn and subsidize their livings. In contrast, migrant families have relayed on remittance, which triggered youths of non-migrant families to engage in risk-taking migration. On the other hand, youths from migrant families have been starting to imagine living a 'dream' life or what they called "Western mode of life," which they watch in movies. To meet this ambition, they mostly take migration as the main resort. In this context, migration is both a means of maintaining the economy and a criterion for attaining social status.

In general, migration factors are diverse, complex, and not static; they change over time and place. Thus, to understand this, there is a need to conduct longitudinal studies and understand the dynamics and draw socio-economic and political policies to mitigate the challenges in it and use the advantages for the community's overall development. Moreover, migration drivers embedded with diversified dimensions cannot be measured merely by socio-econometrics, environmental and political changes, or other challenges; they transcend beyond those simplistic linear connections of variables. Hence, human migration can be

shaped and reshaped through numerous tuning points; as noted under Turner's (1969) notion of liminality, migration conditions can change across multiple times and places and involve diverse characters or divergent intervening variables.

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